Saturday, July 21, 2012

The Lobotomizing A's


Being an Oakland A’s fan is frequently an exercise in creative lobotomy.

In 2006 the A’s reached the American League Championship Series, they had a strong team and a recent history of Moneyball fueled success. When Magglio Ordonez deposited a Huston Street offering into the left field bleachers to complete a humiliating four game sweep, A’s fans everywhere lost the part of their brains that believed in destiny. The part that assumed with a self-assured passion that if our team had a compelling enough story, a powerful enough lineup and a sufficiently long record of barely averted victory we were destined to succeed.

In 2007 Dan Haren started the All-Star Game. Nick Swisher was a fan favorite star and Jack Cust came out of nowhere to be a three true outcomes (walk, strikeout, homerun) hero. And then, the stars were gone, and the part of our minds that believed in spunky success, in winning with flash, were seared away.

2008 was the year of bargain bin success. Cust blasted 33 homers, Frank Thomas hit a triple, Ryan Sweeney and Jack Hannahan wowed on defense and Rajai Davis ran away with every base on the field. Justin Duchscherer became a starting pitcher, and a good one at that, and Dana Eveland and Greg Smith became the most watchable soft tossing lefties in the league. And then, despite a decent first half performance, the A’s traded Rich Harden to the Cubs and Joe Blanton to the Phillies, for what amounted to fifteen hits from Josh Donaldson a set of superb stirrup socks and 151 mediocre innings from Josh Outman. That quickly, the part of every A’s fan that trusted, defended and lionized Billy Beane without reservation winked out of existence.

That is not to say that we lost all faith in Beane, for he pivoted quickly, and 2009 began with a set of stars in the lineup and young brilliance in the rotation and bullpen. But the 2009 A’s tanked, and they did so in an entirely disheartening manner. Matt Holliday wanted to be anywhere else but Oakland, as his hitting before and after his trade to the Cardinals clearly displayed. Even worse, Eric Chavez, whose likeness adorned every lunchbox, calendar and poster the A’s handed out, played only eight games all year. In 2009 A’s fans lost the ability to expect even mediocrity from their players.

2010 seems in hindsight to have been a happy time to be an A’s fan. The young players stockpiled by Beane finally began to produce, the team still couldn’t hit, but still rode spectacular pitching performances to a .500 record. Yet 2010 must be understood not as a respite from the piecemeal destruction of the hopes, happiness and brains of Athletics fans, but as a nefarious and entirely intentional build-up to even more through destruction. For in 2011 the A’s had the pitching, a bit of power and a fun team. And then the universe informed Brett Anderson that throwing a slider 40% of the time was simply unfair. Of course, the universe, being a shameless hussy, did so by turning his elbow ligaments into spaghetti. The A’s fell apart, and at the end of the season Beane sold off all of the parts.

Gio Gonzalez, Trevor Cahill, Ryan Sweeney, Brad Zeigler, Josh Willingham, and Andrew Bailey disappeared. The A’s began to rebuild their roster again, thus admitting that the previous effort had been an unmitigated failure. Worse, we traded away players who were young, under team control for years, and fan favorites. Those players had been our reason to go to the ballpark. They had captivated us with their talent, their youth and their promise, and their departure robbed me of one of my personal pleasures: paging through the lists of A’s prospects and imagining what could be. Why should I hope for young men to grow and succeed when they might play for the Green and Gold for barely a year before being traded?

During the few months prior to the start of the season, A’s fans silently took stock. We had lost destiny, success, trust, mediocrity, and promise. There was nothing left to cut away.

And then the A’s had to go and ruin the narrative: after a slow start they morphed into one of the Cinderella stories of Major League Baseball. Yet this A’s team bears no resemblance to the lobotomizing teams of years past. The A’s hit for power, they never allow runs, they steal when they have to and they galvanize the sleepy crowds.

In fact, the only thing that these Swingin’ A’s bear in common with the Swooning A’s of the past half decade, is the walk-offs. Despite all the pain and suffering, the A’s never lost the walk-off. Now that is not to say that they produced walk-off hits with any great frequency, but their walk-offs had a character, a drama, a majestic beauty entirely out of proportion to their frequency. Jack Cust’s three run blast to cap off his magical first week, Marco Scutaro’s foul pole victory over Mariano Rivera, Mark Ellis’ wall scraping homer on throwback day… The A’s produced good drama, even as they failed to play good baseball. Those walk-offs were the only breaks that A’s fans had from the constant lobotomization.

In 2012 the A’s have combined drama and good baseball, they have built a powerful narrative, boast a strong lineup and exciting pitching and win in fun ways. Slowly the lights are coming back on (yes I am aware I am mixing metaphors, just go with it, ok), and A’s fans are remembering how to root for a good team, how to trust our general manager, how to appreciate mediocrity and hope for victory. I can only hope that these A’s aren’t just setting us up for a fall. Even more than that, if the A’s do begin to lose, I hope the walk-offs never stop.

Wednesday, July 18, 2012

The Struggles Of Tim Lincecum


From time to time, on early mornings commutes to work, I turn the radio to KNBR 680, the local 24/7 sports station. I don’t especially enjoy the radio personalities and it’s hard to believe that the “callers” live on the same planet (in the same town!) as I do, but something about the mindless flow of sports talk makes the commute a little saner. I’ve noticed that sports radio focuses like a sniper-dot on a topic, until it passes or is exhausted, and then it moves on to the next target. Over the all-star break, the Bay Area sports media took the topic of the importance of Tim Lincecum’s next start between its teeth and gnawed on it for the week.

From the Giants organization there were rumblings of this being the deciding start. “If he struggles again, he may get moved to relief or have a start skipped.” Everyone on KNBR agreed. As much as we all love him, the Giants cannot keep Timmy on the mound if he keeps getting knocked around. But after eight brilliants innings, eleven strikeouts and one walk, for one night Tim Lincecum was returned to mythical form. Thankfully, once again, no longer looking human*.

*So much about sports I love because I relate to the teams and players on a human level. The oscillation between the struggle and success of sports resonates with the ups and downs of my own life. But Timmy, to me, is a player that needs to be inhuman. The perfectly balanced delivery, his undersized frame, and the way his splitter looked hittable until the very last moment. A pitcher as unique as Lincecum should be otherworldly.

And after watching the start, I thought back to all the KNBR commentators who talked about the value of the second half; how it can give a player a chance to start over again. I found myself wanting to dismiss this attitude. Statistically, Lincecum was striking out too many players not to regress (progress) to the mean eventually. I almost convinced myself that I knew this would happen, that I was waiting for it. But the truth is, I bought completely into Tim Lincecum poor mental state. I knew something was wrong. I didn’t know what, but I knew it was more than bad luck.

I think the mental side of the game is too quickly dismissed in the sabermetrics community (even if it is overplayed in traditional baseball talk). There’s evidence for it; behavioral science strongly suggests that context affects human behavior. And baseball players should be no different. Perhaps the all-star break allowed Lincecum a chance to shift his attention from all the bad starts earlier this year and focus on the game at hand. I’ll never know. That's what bugs me—the not knowing. I love sabermetrics because it allows me to further explore the game. Batting average and RBI totals can only tell so much of a story; with advanced statistics I keep reading. When I start to consider the mental side to pro baseball, it's all speculation. There are a thousand possibilities for why Lincecum is struggling … and you can hear them all on KNBR.

So for now I’m going to have to accept the not knowing. Sometimes a player is unlucky. Sometimes he’s in a mental funk and as a fan I have to cross my fingers and hope he breaks out of it. And maybe that's why I like listening to all the wild theories in the morning. My logical mind rejects them, but part of baseball is the not knowing. 

Saturday, July 14, 2012

Failing at Baseball Writing in the Old-Fashioned Way


Players who bunt, hit sacrifice flies, and steal bases are given the benefit of the doubt by the baseball press. Perhaps it is because they always appear to be trying so very hard, while stately sluggers are always walking or trotting around the bases. Ever since Moneyball (the book) came out, profile pieces about this sort of player have typically been accompanied by some sort of backslap at sabermetrics, always in the form of irritation with these newfangled mathematics for not seeing proper value in the author’s scrappy subject.

Marcus Hayes’ column about Juan Pierre for the Philadelphia Daily News provides a perfect specimen of such a work. All the clichés are there: bunting practice, a physical defect to overcome, having to fight through some form of baseball adversity, people from the south… Normally I would not deign to refute these concocted storylines, for such pabulum is the preferred fare of the vast majority of baseball writers. In this case, however, I am unable to restrain myself, for in addition to these harmless clichés, Hayes misinterprets and misuses sabermetric statistics on a level so basic and straightforward that his actions border on tragedy.

After Pierre assaults sabermetrics, or “cybergenics” as he calls them, for not properly appreciating his contributions on the field, Hayes produces an example from the sabermetric field that niftily proves his point:

“In fact, Pierre's sabermetric WAR-wins above replacement, the gold standard of metrics - stands at 1.4 this season.
Which, according to one pocket-protected website, rates him as a ‘scrub.’”

The “pocket-protected website” from which he retrieved the statistic, is baseball-reference.com. I discovered this by looking up JuanPierre on both baseball-reference and Fangraphs.com, the homes of two dueling types of WAR and seeing which one had valued Pierre at 1.4. It did not take me long to do so, but then, I spend an embarrassingly large plurality of my spare time on these sites and was able to navigate them successfully. By neglecting to provide a link to the requisite page, or even naming the site that he then proceeded to demean and insult, Hayes failed in his duty as a journalist to cite his sources and allow his readers to check his work.

Hayes’ trivialization of sabermetrics aside, the true idiocy of his argument comes from his misuse of the statistic that he so readily derides. Wins Above Replacement (WAR) is a deceptively simple statistic. It measures the contributions of a player to his team above that which a freely available replacement from the minor leagues would be able to provide. To that end WAR includes the player’s offensive, defensive and baserunning contributions. The fangraphs and baseball-reference versions of WAR for position players function on the same principle and merely use different styles of fielding metrics (pitching is a different and altogether more complicated issue).

Now here comes the part Hayes didn’t really think through. Baseball-reference provides a helpful key, explaining in very simplistic terms what levels of performance different WAR values coincide with:

“8+ MVP, 5+ All-Star, 2+ Starter, 0-2 Substitute, < 0 Replacement level player”

Based on this key alone, it would appear that Hayes is indeed correct, the pocket-protector-platoon has failed to value Pierre’s contributions properly as it ranks him as a mere substitute player, a scrub as he puts it.

You might have already noticed the problem: that helpful key is meant to be applied to a full year’s performance. The inclusion of MVP as a category should really have clued Hayes into that fact. Pierre has complied 1.4 WAR in a mere 262 plate appearances (PA), less than half of what would be considered a full season! According to WAR, if Pierre were to double his plate appearances over the remainder of the season, to end with 524 PA (a respectable if somewhat low total for a full season), he would produce 2.8 wins for his team and be considered a solid regular producer, even a minor star!

Quite simply, by failing to take the time to understand the sabermetric realm, Hayes compromised his own argument and, even more tragic, missed the chance to write a truly original piece that could have presented sabermetrics and “scrappy” baseball players as part of the same game. As all people who take the time to play, watch, write about, and discuss baseball are equally in love with the game, such a discussion would have been powerful and, perhaps, even therapeutic for the fragmented baseball public.

Friday, July 6, 2012

Hell-boy vs. BABIP


Jeremy Hellickson was plucked from high school by the Tampa Bay Rays in the fourth round of the 2005 draft. During his six years in the minor leagues he struck out 9.8 batters per nine innings, while walking 2.1. He racked up a superb 2.71 ERA and allowed only 7.4 hits per nine innings.

In August of 2008 the Rays, historically patient developers of pitching prospects, finally granted the minor league hitters a reprieve from his destructive fastball, changeup, curveball combination. Hellickson’s instant success in the majors, he boasts a 3.14 ERA in 2+ seasons in the majors and the 2011 American League Rookie of the Year Award, rescued what had been a disaster draft for the Devil Rays organization.

The three players chosen ahead of Hellickson by the Devil Rays, Wade Townsend, Chris Mason and Bryan Morris have yet to reach the majors seven years later. Their nineteenth round selection, high school first baseman Ike Davis declined to sign and was selected by the Mets in the first round three years later. Even with his struggles this year, Davis would have been the second best player taken by the Rays in that draft, aside from Hellickson.

Yet the undoubted success of the semi-aptly named Hell-boy at the big league level has left many sabermetricians confused.

During his 36.1 inning stint in the majors in 2010, Hellickson struck out 8.17 and walked 1.98. His performance was exactly what the pitching-greedy Rays were hoping for, as he was able to maintain his minor league strikeout and walk rates while transitioning to the majors. The next two and a half years, however, have been something of a shock. Not in terms of results, for Hellickson’s ERA and innings pitched total have been excellent thus far. No, the shock has come from how exactly he is doing it.

Batting average on balls in play (BABIP) is a crucial sabermetric concept. It measures how often a batter reaches base when they do not hit a homerun, walk or strikeout. The major league average BABIP is .292 thus far this season, and rarely budges much below that. In his 312.1 career innings, Hellickson has produced a .237 BABIP. In 87 innings this year he has compiled a slightly higher but still impressive BABIP of .255. Combined with his propensity for stranding runners who reach base against him (82.1% career, 83% 2012, 72.4% league average), Hell-boy’s low BABIP has raised his Fielding Independent Pitching (FIP) statistic, which measures only walks, strikeouts, and home runs, to a sabermetric disaster of 5.42 this season.

His performance in the statistical areas that pitchers have the most control over, has made him a below replacement player.

So what does Hellickson’s eternal battle with BABIP mean for his future success and his current worth? Starting with the latter question, even though he has not struck out many batters, and has allowed a large number of home runs, he has compiled an ERA .60 runs lower than the league average. Those runs saved will remain saved. However, his predictive statistics suggest that he will not save runs at a near-elite rate in the future, thus putting his future success in doubt. The question is complicated further by the absurd dichotomy between Hell-boy the minor leaguer, who was a saber-boy’s dream, and Hell-boy the big leaguer, a sabermetrician’s nightmare.

So, who is Jeremy Hellickson? Should he be defined by his ERA, his BABIP or his FIP? Or, despite his two seasons of experience, should the acronym drifting next to his name in the box score still be my all time favorite: SSS, small sample size.

Monday, June 25, 2012

How To Analyze a Baseball Player


Evan Grant of the Dallas Morning News chose to analyze Michael Young this afternoon. Specifically, he chose to discuss the recent calls from the sabermetric, and observant, circles of the baseball world, which have been calling for Michael Young to be removed from the Fifth spot in the lineup. He chose to do so by discussing statistics that Michael Young has produced in this year and in years past, as well as the performance of his peers in important situations. By doing so he upheld the required traditions of the sports-writing profession:

He presented statistical evidence
He interpreted it
He offered his conclusions

And, in the finest tradition of the sports-writing profession, he defiled those concepts with a thoroughness and rapacity that would amaze and disgust the most virulent trumpeter of calumnies in the Roman Senate of Antiquity.

Let us, the discerning sabermetric public, analyze the five points that he presents from the perspective of someone without a deadline to meet, an agenda to fulfill and a locker-room to gain access to.


  1)    “Young’s track record is that he hits.”

Grant’s first point is somewhat longer in actuality, but the entire argument can be rendered in this single declarative phrase. And he is, in the strictest sense, correct. Michael Young, as a player of the batting/fielding persuasion in the sport/game known as baseball swings his bat at the onrushing ball and makes contact 83% of the time (a full 3% of the time above average for his career). To be more specific, Young has, for his career “hit” exactly 5% better than the average major leaguer. When he was a decent fielding shortstop that made him a minor star. As a defensively challenged designated hitter, his career rate would make him a below average player. His production THIS SEASON = 30% BELOW average, makes him a bad player.

  2)    “Whether he puts up the typical numbers of a No. 5 batter or not, Young is the Rangers’ veteran leader.”

Questions of clubhouse leadership aside, suffice it to say that this quote was written about a man who publicly complained about team management and demanded a trade when he was replaced by a superior player not once but twice. That he has been feted instead of disemboweled by the national sports media speaks to their remarkable penchant for terming white infielders scrappy leaders regardless of their on or off the field performance.

  3)    “No Replacements”

The title of the third section of Evan Grant’s article is perhaps the most remarkably and obviously idiotic pair of words since “Mission Accomplished.” To claim that there are no replacements for Michael Young in the Fifth spot in the lineup requires a dexterity with statistics that would flummox most congressional chart makers. Mr. Grant does his best by explaining why Nelson Cruz, Texas’ slugging right fielder, and decidedly not the best statistical choice to move up in the lineup right now (that would be Mike Napoli), would fail at the role:

“For his career, Cruz is a .253 hitter with an .819 OPS. In the sixth spot it’s .862 and in the seventh spot it’s .928. When the Rangers’ lineup works right, it’s most dangerous because Young does his thing in the fifth spot and Cruz and others do theirs lower in the order.”

Notice that Mr. Grant is not arguing that Cruz has struggled with runners in scoring position this year, he hasn’t, or that he has hit worse than Young historically, he hasn’t (14% above average for his career versus Young’s aforementioned 5%). Instead, he trots out Cruz’s statistics based on where in the lineup he is hitting. Now let me be clear, I believe that Young should bat lower in the lineup because the fifth spot comes to bat more frequently than the seventh or eighth spots, where his production suggests he belongs. I do not believe that a player’s production is adversely affected by what spot they are placed in, as Mr. Grant seems to most fervently believe. Or if so the decrease in production caused by a player being in these “high-pressure, run-producing spots” is more than outweighed by the additional at bats that the better (if supposedly stressed) batter receives.

Mr. Grant’s fourth point so depresses me as to the state of statistics in baseball reporting that I am not sure if I can go on. I shall, however, because evil must be opposed… even when it is incredibly tiresome to do so and the evil itself has no real effect on the lives and livelihoods of human beings.

Here it is, quoted in its entirety:
  4)    “Grade on the curve: Young is hitting .200 with runners in scoring position since May 1. That’s very out of character and ranks in the bottom 15 among 79 AL players with at least 40 plate appearances with runners in scoring position. But, here are guys who are batting less in the same period with RISP: Alex Rodriguez (.196), Curtis Granderson (.190), Derek Jeter (.171) and Robinson Cano (.156). For the year, Young is still at .269 with RISP, a touch better than Cruz (.268) and significantly better than Ian Kinsler (.254) and Napoli (.231). Offensive numbers are down all across baseball.”

Instead of using florid prose to convince you of the idiocy of this statement, I will simply list things that are wrong with it:
A)   Arbitrary starting point of measuring period. (baseball players, unlike May Flowers and April Showers, are not affected by when months begin and end)
B)   Cherry picked statistics: Young is batting .200 with runners in scoring position… and on a 2-1 count Young is batting .227… you now know just as much about Young’s hitting this year as you did when you read Grant’s statement.
C)   Cherry picked comparisons: Rodriguez’s, Cano’s and Jeter’s batting averages have nothing to do with the discussion, and by admitting that Cruz’s batting average with runners in scoring position effectively disproves his point, as if Cruz is a better hitter overall, and a better hitter in the clutch, then… #clubhouseleader, debate over.

Number 5 makes little sense from a statistical, logical, baseball, or strategic perspective, here it is in its entirety:
  5)    “The Angels aren’t doing any better: The Angels split the No. 4-5 spots between Mark Trumbo and Kendrys Morales. Morales is hitting .269 with RISP for the year, tied with young. Since May 1, his OPS of .533 with RISP is worse than Young. The Angels aren’t panicking and stay on a stalking pace with the Rangers. For the year, Morales has shown a tad more pop than young, but the numbers are otherwise similar. Why should the Rangers be the ones to break stride and make a change. They are leading this race.”

After conveniently ignoring the slugging ways of Trumbo moments after mentioning him, Mr. Grant chose to excoriate Kendrys Morales and his .533 On-base+slugging percentage with runners in scoring position (since May 1).

Putting aside the fact that over the season as a whole, with runners in scoring position Morales beats Young in terms of OPS .683 to .644, I would like us all to merely appreciate that Evan Grant actually knows what OPS is. That does not redeem him or his writings, I would merely like it to be noted that Evan Grant knows what OPS is.

I am enjoying the small sabermetric victories today.

From a strategic standpoint, if your primary opponent chooses to do something that hurts them, you do not have to match their self-destructive tendencies point for point. For the same reason that Francisco Pizarro did not give up his artillery and arquebuses when he battled stone-sword waving Incas, the Rangers should not bat a bad hitter fifth just because the Angels have been batting a mediocre hitter fifth from time to time.

Evan Grant used statistics, he interpreted, and he drew conclusions, but at no point did he do so correctly, and everything he did was colored by bias. In short, this was not how to analyze a baseball player.

Wednesday, June 20, 2012

Simply Perfect


I now accept that I just watched the best game I will ever see. Matthew Cain pitched nine perfect innings AND tied Sandy Koufax’s record for the most strikeouts (14) in a perfect game. My favorite pitcher, for my favorite team, pitched the best game I have ever seen (Cain’s game comes in a three way tie for the second best game score—ever). After the shock of the moment wore off and I stopped uncontrollably sobbing, my “thinking” brain rebooted, and I thought about baseball, statistics and perfection.

Half the fun of baseball is watching the game; the other half comes from talking about the statistics behind the game. For, me the motto of baseball becomes a variation on Leahry’s “turn on, tune in, drop out”—watch it, record it, graph it out. Through numbers, we think about the game in new ways. We can celebrate the statistical impossibility of DiMaggio’s hitting streak, or poke fun at the exact terribleness of the Mendoza line. The language of baseball becomes numbers and the stories they tell.

And we celebrate excellence with numbers. A player who exceeds a numeric benchmark surpasses merely great and becomes exceptional. 714 homeruns defines Babe Ruth; Henderson has his impossible number of steals, Ripken showed up every day, and Pete Rose kept getting hits. When a player approaches 3,000 hits or 600 homeruns, fans watch every at-bat, inhaling the excitement surrounding the achievement. When the player crosses that line, he is something new. A 30 game gap can’t explain the great divide between a 300 wins and 270.

For me, the feeling of a perfect game fell into a different category. Cain’s game packed the energy and emotion of Barry’s homerun chase into a single night. But it was also different. Like the homerun chase, you knew it was coming; every at-bat built towards the end. Unlike the chase, which seemed inevitable, the perfect game built out by out, with the unnerving potential to come crashing down.

The perfect game occurs in spite of baseball. Failure is accepted in baseball. “Even the best players fail more than half the time.” Ted Williams struck out. Tom Seaver surrendered homeruns. Like a lesson right out of my childhood— nobody is perfect.

But for one night, one beautiful night, Matt Cain pitched to 27 batters. Only 14* of those batters ran towards first base. After one historical catch, a handful of brilliants plays, and no bad pitches— Matt Cain was perfect.

Maybe that’s why I don’t talk about something so fragile; baseball is not supposed to be perfect. Streaks end, records are broken, and the best teams lose to the worst teams. We expect imperfection and celebrate players who succeed despite our expectations. But for one night in baseball, everything can be perfect. And I will never see a better game.

*There was one strikeout on a ball in the dirt.

Monday, June 11, 2012

Clutchitude and Suckitude


The Giants’ pitching staff has the third highest clutch rating, as measured by Fangraphs.com, in the Majors.* The Giants rank behind only the over-achieving Orioles and Pirates in terms of their performance in high leverage situations. Clutch ratings are subject to a great deal of variation due to luck and small sample sizes. Additionally, there is some question as to how much control pitchers have over their performance in clutch situations. Those concerns aside, it does serve as a simple way to analyze how well a particular team or player has performed when the game was on the line.

*For a detailed description of how Clutch scores are calculated, see the Fangraphs glossary. For now it is enough to know that it measures how well players perform in high leverage situations when placed in a “context neutral environment”  and measured against the entire league and each player’s own historical performance.

Unsurprisingly, the best performers on the Giants’ pitching staff include the preternaturally skilled Madison Bumgarner, the enigmatically brilliant Matt Cain and the remarkably competent Santiago Casilla.

Surprisingly, to those who have paid little attention to the Giants’ season thus far, two time Cy Young Award Winning, All-Star Pitcher Tim Lincecum ranks second to last on the team in clutch score. (In last sits the execrable Steve Edlefsen)

Lincecum’s struggles have been well documented this season. The combination of Lincecum’s past success, his quotable personality, his cultural cachet and the true depths of suckitude to which he has descended have produced a plethora of articles on the subject.


It's obvious that there are two Tim Lincecums now:
1. The pitcher out of the windup, who will never have Madduxian command, but who can still strike out hitters on three pitches, strike out the side, and look like the pitcher we remember
2. The pitcher out of the stretch, who is sprinkled with weaponized Jonathan Sanchez dust

Grant’s hyperbolic point is essentially correct, with the bases empty, Tim Lincecum strikes out 11.67 batters per nine innings, walking 3.43 and allowing less than one homerun per nine.

With men on base he strikes out 7.16 and walks 6.61.

There is no possible world in which those numbers are acceptable from a major league pitcher.

As good as Lincecum has been at keeping runners off base- allowing only a .312 OBP with the bases empty- his awfulness at keeping those runners who do reach base from scoring is truly remarkable.

The 39 batters who have thus far faced Lincecum in high leverage situations have produced a batting line of .344/.474/.679. For comparison purposes, in Albert Pujols’ spectacular 2008 season he complied a .357/.462/.653 line. Lincecum has, in effect, turned every batter he faces during a high leverage situation into vintage Pujols.

The most horrifyingly interesting statistic that Lincecum’s train wreck of a season has produced thus far is that in high leverage situations, he has stranded -18.1% of runners who have are on base. That negative sign was not a type-o. In a league which strands 72.5% of runners overall, even if the negative sign had been a type-o, his performance still would have been Edlefsen-worthy.

Now consider how clutch the Giants’ pitching staff has been this year. Whether or not their performance in high leverage situations is sustainable is not at issue. Instead, merely admire the remarkable cultchitude™ of the Giants’ pitchers, who have managed to perform so well as a group when the game is on the line that they have been able to overcome the massive negative impact of 72 innings of Bad Lincecum.

Since 2009, when the all-pitch, no-hit Giants model fully emerged to provide endless Torture as only the Giants can, their various pitchers have led the majors in clutch score, ranking a full point ahead of their closest competition, the Lost Anaheim Angels of Angeles.

As hopeful as that long history of clutchitude may make a Giants fan, it is worth noting that those years (apart from this one) all involved superb seasons from Lincecum both in terms of standard pitching success and in clutch rating. If the Lincecum who has been pitching out of the stretch remains befuddled by “weaponized Jonathan Sanchez dust,” or baseball gods forbid, his stretch suckitude seeps over into his pitches delivered from the windup, Giants fans could be in for more torture than they reckoned for.