The Oakland Athletics had three first round draft picks in
the Amateur draft tonight. The A’s were gifted with the 11th overall
pick and two supplemental picks at the end of the first round, provided as
compensation for the loss of free agents this last offseason. Led presumably by
Billy Beane,* the A’s chose a high school infielder with each pick.
*Have you accepted
Billy Beane as your lord and savior yet?
When the first selection, that of Addison Russell, High
School Shortstop from Florida was announced, the Sabermetric experts were
surprised, the Baseball Network crew were shocked and appalled, Harold Reynolds
remained Harold Reynolds, but with a slightly shriller voice… In short, the
world as we know it was not brought to an end, but to many baseball insiders
and mildly informed fans, Beane’s selection of a High School player ran
contrary to many of their preconceived impressions of his drafting philosophy.
For those few of you who did not read Moneyball, the short explanation is this: Beane determined that
College players were laughably, absurdly better investments than high school
players. This was because college players would, of necessity, accumulate a
sizeable body of statistics during their careers, and against a much higher
level of competition than their high school equivalents. The physical bodies of
college players would also have more time to mature, injuries would occur and,
most importantly to the perpetually cash strapped A’s, their bonus demands
would steadily drop as they lost negotiating leverage. Beane’s preference for
college players was backed by the estimable Bill James, and has since been
confirmed by a plethora of statistical studies.
So why then did Beane abandon his statistically grounded
study to sweep up high school hitters by the metaphorical truckload?*
*Beane has not selected a high school player in the first round since the Jeremy Bonderman debacle of 2001, again, read Moneyball for more details.
There are 4 factors that I believe contributed to this
seeming change of tactics, each of which is merely representative of a broader
theme within the game.
1)
Moneyball
has always been misinterpreted. The mindset that Moneyball represents did
not, as Joe Morgan apparently still believes, require its practitioner to sign
slow, poor fielding, patient college players who look bad in denim. Instead,
Moneyball represented a truly all-encompassing approach to baseball management.
Hamstrung by a low budget and a bad stadium, Beane chose to acquire those
players whose productive skills were undervalued by the baseball establishment.
For quite some time, college players who could lay off a slider in the dirt
were heavily undervalued. Thanks largely to Beane’s success, that is no longer
the case.
2)
High
School Hitters are not High School Pitchers. The research into draft pick
results has decisively concluded that college pitchers are much better than
their high school counterparts. Not only do they reach the majors faster, they
are also far more likely to reach the majors at all. That high success rate is
balanced out partially by their degree of success: high school pitchers are
much more likely to become allstars. Yet when the aggregate components are
added together, Victor Wang still concluded that college pitchers were always
the better choice.
High school hitters, however, fared far
better in comparison. Wang concluded that hitters drafted in the first round
provided identical value to their teams no matter their level of education. In
the second round college hitters gained a small advantage in performance but in
the third high school hitters pulled well ahead. While these calculations must
be balanced against those of Nate Gilmore who determined that high school
hitters become stars less frequently than their counterparts and can take over
two years longer to develop, it is clear that the gap between the two classes
of hitters is not nearly as large as some talking heads have claimed.
3)
The new
cap on draft spending curtails large bonuses. Beane surely had mixed
feelings about the institution of the new collective bargaining agreement this
last winter. While the provisions that curtail excessive spending on prospects
have placed his small budget team on an even playing field with its rivals, it
also prevents the A’s from securing a large class of young players for far less
than what they would have to spend on the free agent market to attain
comparable value. In this draft, however, Beane seems to have chosen to bank on
the high upside of high school hitters, whose bonus demands will undoubtedly be
less than college players who have more national exposure and connection to
agents/ advisors/agent provocateurs. With little difference in expected
production between high school and college hitters, the lower prices of the
former assuredly factored into Beane’s decision making process. The longer
development times of such players are of little concern to a franchise that
cares little for its existing fanbase and is dedicated to contending in 4-6
years in a nearby city that shall remain nameless.
4)
The 2012
draft class was uniquely, perversely, weak in terms of college age hitters.
Had Beane wanted to splurge on a trio of college bashers, he would have been
hard pressed to find three worthy of the investment, as prospect guru John Sickels wrote:
This draft isn't
as good as 2011 certainly, but it isn't as bad as some people say. Strengths
include high school position players with upside, and a whole bushel of guys
who project as impressive relief arms. College hitting is the biggest weakness.
Only 6 out of the 31 picks made in the first
round were college position players, and several of those, notably Tyler Naquin
by the Indians and James Ramsay by the Cardinals were considered overdrafts.
While there were a number of superb college pitchers in the draft, the best
were taken before the Athletics’ first pick, and the rest would have been too
pricey for their budget as compared to their production.
Seen in this light, Beane’s decision to draft Addison
Russell, Daniel Robertson, and Matt Olson was in keeping with his dedication to
finding and acquiring undervalued assets cheaply, and simultaneously fulfills
the need of the team on the field for infield offense, the ownerships’ need for
delayed offense, and the new collective bargaining requirement for decreased
expenditures.
This draft was not a sign, as Harold Reynolds believes, that
“teams are learning how to develop players again, and not relying on colleges
to do it for them.” It is instead a sign of how intelligent baseball people adapt
to changing circumstances and increasing competition.
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